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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE- CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS- IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES- The
United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment does not require a sheriff's department to
establish identification procedures to ascertain the validity of a
prisoner's protests of mistaken identity so long as the prisoner's arrest
was made pursuant to a validly issued warrant.
Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979).
In October, 1972, Leonard McCollan was arrested in Potter County,
Texas, on narcotics charges while carrying a driver's license identical
to that of his brother, Linnie, except that it contained Leonard's pic-
ture instead of Linnie's.' Leonard was booked as Linnie Carl McCollan,
signed various documents using Linnie's name, and was released on
bail as Linnie Carl McCollan.2
Subsequently, for unknown reasons, the bondsman sought and
received an order allowing him to surrender Leonard. Since Leonard
had been masquerading as Linnie, the arrest warrant was issued in the
name of Linnie Carl McCollan.5 On December 26, 1972, the real Linnie
McCollan was stopped for a traffic violation in Dallas, Texas, and a,
routine warrant check revealed an outstanding warrant from Potter
County in his name. McCollan was arrested despite his protests of
mistaken identity.' The Dallas Police Department compared the infor-
mation on Linnie's driver's license with that contained in the Potter
County Sheriffs Department files, and concluded that he was the
wanted person. 5 Potter County deputies took custody of Linnie Mc-
Collan on December 30th, and placed him in the Potter County jail
over his continued protests of mistaken identity. Four days later the
Potter County officials discovered their error by comparing Linnie Mc-
1. Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2692-93 (1979). The manner in which Leonard
McCollan procured the falsified driver's license was unknown. Id.
2. Id. at 2693.
3. Id. Leonard's bondsman received the surrender order pursuant to TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19 (Vernon 1977) which provides: "Any surety, desiring to sur-
render his principal, may upon making affidavit of such intention before the court or
magistrate before which the prosecution is pending, obtain from such court or magistrate
a warrant of arrest for such principal, which shall be executed as in other cases." Gener-
ally, the effect of a surrender of the principal by his surety on a bond of recognizance is to
relieve them from further liability on the instrument. See, e.g., Rachel v. State, 102 Tex.
Crim. 97, 277 S.W. 649 (1925).
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2693.
5. Id.
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Collan's appearance with the file photographs of his wanted brother;
McCollan was then immediately released.'
Linnie McCollan brought a damages action against the Potter
County Sheriff in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas. The basis of McCollan's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983'
was that the Sheriff's negligent failure to investigate his protests of
mistaken identity constituted a deprivation of liberty without due pro-
cess of law.' After each party presented his case, the district court
directed a verdict in favor of Sheriff Baker and his surety without
articulating its reasons.' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court decision, holding that
the sheriff had a duty to exercise due diligence in determining
whether the person arrested and detained was actually the person
sought under the warrant and not merely someone of the same or
similar name.' °
The Fifth Circuit characterized McCollan's claim as a section 1983
false imprisonment action," and stated that the issue was whether or
not the sheriff's actions were unreasonable, in that he had not
established a policy of sending photographs and fingerprints, nor had
he seen fit to ensure that someone was on duty to check the prisoner's
identity upon arrival or during his stay at the jail." Relying upon the
Restatement (Second) of Torts," the court found that McCollan had
established a prima facie case of false imprisonment." Further, the
6. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
8. 99 S. Ct. at 2694. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part that
"[nlo State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...."
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2693.
10. McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Baker v. Mc-
Collan, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979). The respondent originally sued several parties, including the
arresting police officer; the Dallas Chief of Police; Sheriff Baker; and Sheriff Baker's
surety, The Transamerican Insurance Company. The action was dismissed with prejudice
as to the Dallas Police officials. Id. at 511.
11. Id at 511-12.
12. Id at 512-13.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965). The elements considered were (1) in-
tent to confine; (2) acts resulting in confinement; and (3) consciousness of the victim of con-
finement or resulting harm. 575 F.2d at 512.
14. 575 F.2d at 512.
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court noted that the success of Sheriff Baker's defense of qualified
immunity15 was directly related to the question of whether his failure
to institute adequate identification procedures was reasonable.'" Since
the jury could have concluded that the sheriff's actions were
unreasonable, or alternatively, reasonable in light of the attempt by
the Dallas police to verify the information on McCollan's driver's
license, it was error for the district court not to submit the case to the
jury. Accordingly, the case was remanded. 7 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari 8 to decide whether negligent con-
duct could form the basis of an award for damages under section
1983."9 The Court held that McCollan had failed to meet the threshold
requirement of a section 1983 action in that there was no proof that he
had been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States.' Therefore, without reaching the question of the
adequacy of a negligence claim as the basis for a section 1983 action,2'
the Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.'
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, 2 began by noting that
the question of whether an allegation of simple negligence could be suf-
ficient to state a cause of action under section 1983 was more elusive
that it had first appeared. ' Referring to the Court's abortive attempt
to resolve that question in Procunier v. Navarette,25 Justice Rehnquist
15. The qualified immunity from liability in civil suits available to officers of the
executive branch of government depends upon the scope of their duties, their discretion
in executing their duties, and upon all the circumstances as they reasonably appear at the
time they act. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
16. 575 F.2d at 511-13. The court had postponed its opinion until the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
Certiorari had been granted in Procunier to consider whether negligent conduct could
form the basis of an award of damages under § 1983. Procunier was decided, however, on
other grounds. 434 U.S. at 562-63. See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
17. 575 F.2d at 513.
18. 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979).
19. 99 S. Ct. at 2692.
20. Id.
21. Id. -
22. Id. at 2696.
23. The majority included Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, White, Powell
and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion while Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens dissented.
24. 99 S. Ct. at 2692.
25. 434 U.S. 555 (1978). The plaintiff in Procunier alleged in his § 1983 action that the
prison officials had acted negligently in failing to mail his outgoing correspondence. The
Court held that since the constitutional right allegedly violated had not been
authoritatively declared at the time of the prison officials' action, the officials were enti-
tled to prevail on their claim of qualified immunity as a matter of law. Id. at 557-58, 565.
See note 16 supra.
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stated that the instant controversy again illustrated that a uniform
answer covering the entire spectrum of possible constitutional viola-
tions might not be possible. 6 However, since at a minimum section
1983 requires a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States the Court emphasized that if no such
deprivation occurred, the state of mind of the federal defendant was
immaterial.' Applying this threshold test to McCollan's claim that his
detention in the Potter County jail was actionable under section 1983,
the Baker Court noted that although the sheriff's actions may have
been wrongful under a tort law analysis, the real issue was whether
his actions deprived McCollan of his liberty without due process of
law. 8 To decide if McCollan's detention was constitutionally defective,
the Court examined the fourth amendment' requirement that a fair
and reliable determination of probable cause be made prior to any
significant pretrial restraint of liberty." Since McCollan had been
arrested pursuant to a valid warrant issued by a magistrate, on a
showing of probable cause, the Court held that the arrest conformed to
the requirements of the fourth amendment. 1 Because the probable
cause standard for pretrial detention is the same as that for arrest, the
Court ruled that a person arrested pursuant to a valid warrant has no
26. 99 S. Ct. at 2692.
27. Id. The Court noted that the state of mind of the alleged violator might be rele-
vant in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred in the first place. Id.
at 2692 n.1.
28. Id. at 2693. The majority stated that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
never specifically identified the constitutional right allegedly infringed. Since McCollan's
claim and the lower court's decision focused on the prolonged detention caused by the
sheriffs failure to institute identification procedures, which would have disclosed the
error, the Court presumed that it was the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment that was allegedly violated. Id. See note 8 supra.
29. The fourth amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. Pursuant to this amendment, no warrants may issue without probable cause.
Probable cause is an apparent state of facts before an officer which would allow a man of
prudence and caution to believe that an offense has been committed. Locke v. United
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court ruled
that the fourth amendment was applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment.
30. 99 S. Ct. 2694. See Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Gernstein was a class
action suit filed by prisoners of a county jail contesting the legality of their detention
based upon an information filed by the district attorney. The Court held that the fourth
amendment required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and
detached judicial officer and that the informations filed by the district attorney were not
a sufficient determination of probable cause under the fourth amendment to authorize the
pretrial detention of the prisoners after a warrantless arrest.
31. 99 S. Ct. at 2694.
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constitutional right to another judicial determination that there is
probable cause to detain him pending trial. The Court noted that Mc-
Collan had not challenged the validity of the arrest warrant, but
rather, had based his section 1983 claim solely on Sheriff Baker's ac-
tions after he was incarcerated.32
In the absence of an attack upon the validity of the arrest warrant,
the Court analyzed McCollan's complaint as a simple contention that
despite his protests of mistaken identity, he was detained in the jail
until the validity of his protests was ascertained.' Whatever claim
under state tort law McCollan may have had, the Court held that the
facts did not give rise to a constitutional claim, even though he was
deprived of his liberty for a period of days, since his detention was
pursuant to a warrant conforming to the requirements of the fourth
amendment.' The Court noted, however, that a party arrested under a
warrant conforming to the requirements of the fourth amendment
could not be held for an indefinite period of time, for the Constitution
also guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial. This speedy
trial right need not await indictment or other formal charge, as arrest
pursuant to probable cause is itself sufficient to trigger the right.U The
Baker majority also stated that depending on what procedures the
state affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, a
detention in the face of repeated protests of innocence will, after the
lapse of a certain amount of time, deprive the accused of liberty
without due process of law."
The Court, although recognizing that McCollan's innocence was rele-
vant to a tort claim of false imprisonment, stated that his innocence
was largely irrelevant to his claim of a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. 7 If the Constitution guaranteed that only the
guilty would be arrested, section 1983 would provide a cause of action
for every defendant acquitted, and every suspect released." The major-
ity noted that the procedural protections afforded criminal defendants
are not without limits. Due process does not require that every con-
ceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of
32. 1d (citing Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 120).
33. 99 S. Ct. at 2694.
34. 1&
35. Id. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (Court stated that the protec-
tion of the speedy trial provision of the sixth amendment is engaged by an indictment, an
information, or an actual restraint pending a criminal charge). Id. at 320. See also Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2694-95.
37. Id. at 2695.
38. 1d.
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convicting an innocent person.39 Since the fourteenth amendment only
protects against deprivations of liberty without due process of law, the
Court held that an official, charged with executing an arrest warrant
or with maintaining custody of the accused, is not required to perform
an error-free investigation of every claim of innocence, whether the
claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of intent.
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the ultimate determination of
claims of innocence is in the hands of the judge and jury.' The Baker
majority also stated that the tort of false imprisonment does not
become a violation of the fourteenth amendment just because the
defendant is a state official. Consequently, the Court held that Mc-
Collan had not been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution
and therefore had no right to relief under section 1983."
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, noted that the Court had
previously recognized that certain types of conduct which shocked the
conscience,' 2 or were otherwise offensive to the concept of ordered
liberty, were deprivations in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.'3 However, nothing in the sheriff's conduct sug-
gested to Justice Blackmun the type of outrageousness that the
Supreme Court had prohibited under the due process clause." Justice
Blackmun concluded by noting that, in his view, the Baker majority did
not preclude the application of the "shocks the conscience" standard of
due process" nor did it foreclose a prisoner from proving a deliberate
violation of due process by a sheriff who repeatedly refused to check
the identity of a complaining prisoner against readily available mug
shots and fingerprints.'6
Justice Stevens, speaking for the dissenters, argued that the failure
to employ proper identification procedures, reasonably calculated to
establish that a person being detained for the alleged commission of a
crime was in fact the person believed to be guilty of the offense, was a
39. Id. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (state not required to disprove
existence of all affirmative defenses to crime charged if in state's judgment it would be
too cumbersome, too expensive or too inaccurate to do so).
40. 99 S. Ct. at 2695.
41. Id. at 2696.
42. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (use of stomach pump to
recover swallowed narcotics violated due process).
43. 99 S. Ct. at 2696 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that Baker had been sheriff for only forty days prior
to McCollan's detention, and that Baker's sole error was his failure to supervise the
deputies who transferred McCollan to the Potter County jail. There was no evidence that
Sheriff Baker had turned a deaf ear to McCollan's complaints as had his deputies. Id.
45. See note 42 supra.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2696-97 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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deprivation of McCollan's liberty without due process of law.'7 In the
dissenters' view, the imposition of the substantial burdens of pretrial
detention on a man mistakenly identified as a suspect was unconstitu-
tional, and at odds with constitutional constraints imposed upon police
officers in other areas which serve to minimize the risk of unjustifiable
deprivations of liberty. 8
Justice Stevens then criticized the majority's position that the con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial adequately protected a person in
McCollan's situation by noting that a speedy trial within the meaning
of the Constitution may take place weeks or months after the initial
arrest. 9 He noted that under the majority's finding that no constitu-
tional violation had occurred, a petititoner in McCollan's predicament
would not be entitled to habeas corpus relief."0 To Justice Stevens, the
majority's reluctance to impose procedural safeguards was lamentable,
since such a requirement would do no more than require the police to
utilize already existing mechanisms designed to ascertain identity."
Justice Marshall, in a separate dissenting opinion, postulated that the
conduct of the sheriff and his deputies was not negligent but inten-
tional, and as such, violated McCollan's constitutional rights.2
47. Id. at 2697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2699 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct.
2248 (1979) (police must have probable cause to detain as well as to arrest); Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (affidavit in support of search warrant must establish
probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk limited to situations where
police feel suspect may be armed and dangerous).
49. 99 S. Ct. at 2699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2700 n.14. Federal habeas corpus relief is available to state prisoners whose
constitutional rights have been violated. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO,
& H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM Ch.
X (2d ed. 1973); Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar
Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983 (1978). See also Stone v. \Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976),
for a historical development of the federal writ of habeas corpus. Although it is generally
recognized that federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners is available only as a
remedy for violations of constitutional rights, there is language which suggests otherwise.
In Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), the Court stated: "The .... writ ... is to produce
the body of a person before a court for whatever purpose might be essential to the proper
disposition of a cause." Id. at 283. However, this expansive language was limited by the
Court's statement that the elasticity of the writ must be preserved so that a court can
deal effectively with any and all forms of illegal restraint. Id. If the restraint is not illegal,
as the Baker majority holds, then federal habeas corpus relief should not be available to
petitioners in McCollan's position as Justice Stevens indicates. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas corpus is proper instrument to obtain release from unlawful
confinement). But see Todzia v. State, 53 Misc. 2d 200, 278 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(habeas corpus is the only available remedy for false imprisonment).
51. 99 S. Ct. at 2700-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. 99 S. Ct. at 2697 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Brief for Respondent at 13.
1980
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The Baker court has held for the first time53 that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require a jail official to
institute procedures to determine if a prisoner's protests of innocence
are valid, so long as the detention itself is based upon an arrest made
pursuant to a valid warrant.5' To reach this decision, the Court drew
upon well established precedent that arrests, both with and without a
warrant, must be based upon probable cause.55 By virtue of the fourth
amendment's incorporation into the fourteenth amendment," the states
must provide for a fair and reliable determination of probable cause by
a judicial officer, either before or promptly after arrest, before any
significant pretrial restraint of liberty can be imposed. 7 Analytically,
the application of procedural due process concepts to any particular
fact situation traditionally requires a two-stage inquiry." The threshold
question is whether the asserted individual interest is within the pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment. An affirmative response to this
question requires a determination of what procedure is then due.59
Pursuant to this due process analysis, McCollan asserted that he had
a constitutionally protected interest in being free from unreasonable
detention, engaged by his claim of innocence after being arrested
under a valid warrant. He further contended that this interest could be
protected by requiring law enforcement officers to institute identifica-
tion procedures designed to ascertain the validity of his claim of inno-
cence. 0 Analytically, however, the Baker majority refused to recognize
the specific liberty interest asserted by McCollan as being constitu-
tionally protected. Instead, the Court reasoned that a citizen's liberty
interests are adequately protected by reliance upon specific constitu-
tional guarantees. The Court's view that strict adherence to a probable
cause standard affords an adequate measure of protection from
mistaken arrest does little to aid a citizen when the standard fails to
do so, as it did in Baker. Moreover, the protections given to a citizen
53. In Czap v. Marshall, 315 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1963), the
court of appeals held that an arrest and detention in a county jail was not a deprivation of
due process so long as the detention and commitment followed a lawful arrest.
54. 99 S. Ct. at 2693-95.
55. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). See also
note 30 supra.
56. See note 29 supra.
57. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948).
58. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).
59. Id See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972).
60. Brief for Respondent at 12.
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by the probable cause standard operate prior to arrest, not after it. By
requiring a showing of probable cause before arrest, the Constitution
acts as a check upon the virtually unlimited power of the state to
affect the lives of its citizens. The probable cause standard represents
a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty
and the state's duty to control crime."' As the Court noted in Brinegar
v. United States,"' the probable cause standard attempts to safeguard
citizens from rash and unreasonable interference with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime. It also seeks to give fair leeway in
enforcing the law for the community's protection. The rule of probable
cause, therefore, is recognized as a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise yet found for accommodating these
often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law
enforcement, while requiring less would place law-abiding citizens at
the mercy of the officer's whim or caprice."
Once an arrest has been effectuated, however, society's interest in
apprehending criminals has been served, and it would seem that the
primary interest should be the vindication of the innocent. McCollan's
complaint implicated the adequacy of post-arrest protection from
unreasonable detention. These mechanisms are designed to implement
the specific post-arrest guarantees of the Bill of Rights." After arrest
on a warrant, but before indictment, the accused is generally entitled
to a preliminary hearing65 at which a magistrate or judge will inquire
into the truth of the accusations and decide whether there is sufficient
cause to bind over the accused to the grand jury for indictment, or
proceed to trial under the information." If the accused has been
61. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 112.
62. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
63. Id. at 176.
64. The eighth amendment provides that excessive bail shall not be required. U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (presumption of innocence is
meaningless unless the right to bail is preserved). The sixth amendment guarantees the
accused the right to a speedy trial, and invocation of this right need not await indictment
or other formal charge. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See note 35 supra.
65. A preliminary hearing can be bypassed in many states and in federal practice by
seeking an indictment prior to the preliminary hearing. The return of an indictment,
which establishes probable cause, eliminates the need for a preliminary hearing. See, e.g.,
Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Mon-
toya v. State, 464 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) See also Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 68, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
66. The grand jury presents another opportunity to free an arrestee from
unreasonable detention. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). The grand jury will
hear the evidence and decide if sufficient probable cause exists to justify the matter going
to trial. A matter is set for trial when the grand jury returns a "true bill" indicating a
7571980
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released on bail, the judge will determine if he is to remain free on
bail. If no bail has been set, the judge will determine what amount, if
any, is required to secure his release.
6 7
In the majority's opinion, the protection given by probable cause
and these post-arrest guarantees make it unnecessary to require fur-
ther procedure aimed at investigating claims of innocence. 8 This con-
clusion may have been influenced by the facts of the case. There had
been no intentional or deliberate refusal on the part of Sheriff Baker
to check the available files to ascertain the validity of McCollan's
claim. Upon learning of the prisoner's claim, Baker checked the files,
realized the mistake, and immediately released McCollan."9 However,
the defect in the majority's opinion is its refusal to recognize a right to
be free from unreasonable detention after arrest. Had the Court
recognized such a right, the ultimate outcome of the case would prob-
ably have been the same, since Sheriff Baker's reasonable conduct is
directly relevant to a good faith defense. 71
Because the majority did refuse to recognize a protectible liberty
interest in freedom from unreasonable detention, it follows that a vic-
tim of mistaken identity has no cause of action even where the jailor
deliberately refuses to check the veracity of the prisoner's assertion
by comparing available mug shots and fingerprints. Although Justice
Blackmun conditioned his concurrence upon his understanding that the
finding of probable cause. Conversely, if the grand jury returns a "no bill" or a "not
found," it indicates that probable cause was not established and the accused is released.
See G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 146-47 (2d ed. 1973). But see MODERN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE, supra note 65, at 894-97; M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN IN-
STITUTION ON TRIAL 3, 99-102 (1977) (authors dispute the notion that the grand jury affords
any protection to an accused, concluding that the grand jury has become a weapon of the
prosecutor).
67. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 16.01 (Vernon 1977). Texas law pro-
vides for an examining trial if requested by the accused. This procedure should not be
confused with the initial determination of probable cause made by a magistrate either
before or promptly after arrest. The probable cause determination by the magistrate is
not an adversary proceeding, and the accused is not constitutionally entitled to a separate
judicial determination that there is probable cause to detain him pending a preliminary
hearing. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 120. The examining trial or preliminary hear-
ing is an additional proceeding afforded by some states to determine whether the
evidence justifies going to trial under an information or presenting the case to a grand
jury. Id. at 119. This procedure can be avoided by seeking an indictment from the grand
jury. See also note 65 supra. Even if the charges are dismissed at a preliminary hearing,
the prosecution may still seek an indictment from the grand jury. See Ex parte Porter, 16
Tex. Crim. 321 (1884). See also MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 65, at 959,
991-92.
68. 99 S. Ct. at 2695.
69. Id. at 2696 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
70. See id. at 2700 & n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also note 15 supra.
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majority did not preclude the application of the standard enunciated in
Rochin v. California"1 to such a situation," the analysis employed by
the majority would preclude application of Rochin to deliberate
refusals to verify ascertainable claims of innocence. The Baker major-
ity assumes arguendo that after a certain amount of time, and depend-
ing on what procedures the state affords an arrestee prior to trial, a
mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated
protests of innocence will deprive an individual of liberty without due
process of law." Although this statement appears to invite the applica-
tion of Rochin to such a situation, the Court's hypothesis is bottomed
on the absence of the specific post-arrest guarantees relied upon by
the Court as otherwise. adequate to protect one's liberty interest.
Thus, if an arrest is based upon probable cause and if the constitu-
tionally guaranteed post-arrest procedures are intact, the detention
passes constitutional muster even where the jailor deliberately and
intentionally refuses to check the prisoner's claim of mistaken identity
against readily available information. If these specified guarantees are
given to the prisoner, Rochin could not be applied because no other
substantive right is recognized by the majority."' The Baker Court
stated that where these guarantees are present, a sheriff is not
required to perform an investigation of claims of innocence, since the
ultimate determination of such a claim rests with the judge and jury."
Because a sheriff has no duty to investigate, the labeling of his refusal
to do so as deliberate is inconsequential.
Apparently the Court's concern that an investigative requirement
would unduly hamper efficient law enforcement outweighed the
asserted interest in freedom from unreasonable detention. However,
the state's interest in law enforcement has been adequately served
once the accused is taken into custody. After arrest the protection of
71. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See note 42 supra.
72. 99 S. Ct. at 2696 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73. Id at 2694-95.
74. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434
U.S. 1047 (1978). Rodriguez initiated a damages action against several agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, contending that they had violated her right to be free
from unreasonable seizures by indicting and arresting her after a faulty investigation link-
ing her to a gambling operation in which she was not involved. Id. at 1187-88. Rodriguez'
claim was based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), which held that federal agents acting under color of federal law are
subject to private damages actions for fourth amendment violations. Id. at 397. The court
of appeals in Rodriguez held that because the indictment conclusively established prob-
able cause for the arrest, Rodriguez had not been deprived of her fourth amendment
rights even though the agent had conducted a faulty investigation. The court refused to
establish standards governing the conduct of an investigation. 556 F.2d at 1191-92.
75. 99 S. Ct. at 2695.
1980
Duquesne Law Review
individual liberty should have been the Court's paramount concern
because serious deprivations of liberty occur prior to the invocation of
the post-arrest guarantees." Even if the right to a speedy trial is
invoked the day after arrest, it remains that the innocent arrestee has
been deprived of his liberty unnecessarily. This needless deprivation
could be prevented by requiring jail officials to either institute
measures to verify the prisoner's claims of innocence, or to utilize
methods already available to them.7 A jailor's deliberate or intentional
refusal to verify a prisoner's claim of innocence, as in Baker-style situa-
tions, should be a violation of due process guarantees, particularly
when the claim can be readily verified or ascertained. Instead of
requiring a jailor to defend the reasonableness of his actions, the
Baker decision, by refusing to recognize an arrestee's right to be free
from unreasonable detention, effectively insulates even the outrageous
jailor from a civil rights action. The rule in Baker v. McCollan allows
the police, in their custodial capacity, to ignore verifiable contentions
of innocence with a strict reliance on probable cause standards and
post-arrest guarantees. Unfortunately, this will result in the needless
deprivation of an innocent person's liberty even though the proof
necessary to free him is often readily available.
Richard T. McGonigle
76. Id. at 2699 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 114.
77. A claim of mistaken identity, as in a Baker type situation, must be distinguished
from the ordinary claim of innocence. A claim of mistaken identification can be easily
verified by checking the available mug shots and fingerprints. Moreover, where the war-
rant was issued based on a prior arrest, as it was in Baker, it becomes easier to verify the
complaint because fingerprints and mug shots are already on file. Ordinary claims of in-
nocence such as "I didn't do it" are no doubt within the province of the judge and jury as
the Baker court noted. 99 S. Ct. at 2695. To require a sheriff to investigate claims of
mistaken identity as a dictate of due process would not have placed an undue burden on
law enforcement officials because adequate identification mechanisms are already in place.
See id. at 2700 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Note, Garbage In, Gospel Out: Establishing
Probable Cause through Computerized Criminal Information Transmittals, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 509 (1976). See also Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867
(1976), where the plaintiff was held in jail after dismissal of charges despite his inquiries.
Due to a typographical error, Bryan had been detained on the authority of a warrant
improperly indexed to his name. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Bryan had stated a
claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment.
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